In this article, we model the effect of foreign policy attitudes on both vote choice and casualty tolerance, using survey data collected during the 2004 election. We show that prospective judgments of the likelihood of success in Iraq and retrospective judgments of whether the war in Iraq was right are significant determinants of both vote choice and casualty tolerance. The prospective judgment of success is key in predicting casualty tolerance, while retrospective judgment of whether the war was right takes precedence in determining vote choice. In addition, there is an important interaction between the two variables, so the effect of one is conditional on the value of the other.
Introduction
At first glance, the parallels between the 1992 and 2004 Presidential elections appear striking. Both elections featured an incumbent named George Bush who had enjoyed tremendous public support after launching a war in Iraq. Despite the high levels of support, both President Bushes soon found themselves deadlocked in the polls against surprisingly robust Democratic challengers, who were buoyed by widespread perceptions of a weak economy and skyrocketing health care costs. Yet Bush "43" eventually won reelection, while Bush "41" met defeat. What can explain this change in electoral fortunes? There are many possible and complementary explanations for why Bush 43 won despite facing a daunting electoral environment. In this article, we focus on just one which has been the subject of extensive public comment, but hitherto little scholarly analysis: the role of the ongoing Iraq war.
Pundits reconcile the different fates by stating that "Commanders-inChief do not lose elections in wartime." For this law-like aphorism to hold, incumbents must actually be able to obtain their party's nomination. Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson were so unpopular-due in large part to public disenchantment with American participation in the Korean and Vietnam wars-they abandoned their efforts to run for reelection.
1 Moreover, the belief that Americans will not oust incumbent President's during wartime flies in the face of the even more well-entrenched view that Americans will not tolerate casualties in war. The war in Iraq was barely a week old when observers began to worry that news of combat fatalities would cause public support to collapse (Elder and Nagourney 2003; Purdum 2003; Ricks 2003) .
By October of 2004, as Presidential elections loomed, more than 1100 U.S.
military personnel had been killed in Iraq fighting against an insurgency that continued more or less unabated. Had most pundits foreseen this turn of events, they surely would have predicted a complete collapse of public support for the Bush Administration and for the war in Iraq. Moreover, they would have predicted a lopsided electoral defeat for the President in November.
With these competing views of how the war in Iraq would play out politically, pundits and political observers had inadvertently pitted the irresistible force (public opinion in response to casualties) against the immovable object (an incumbent President during war).
The relationship between the war in Iraq, American casualties, and the Presidential election is-to say the least-somewhat conflicted. In this article we seek to make sense of these contradictory expectations by providing a more systematic and nuanced argument linking attitudes toward the war in Iraq, tolerance for U.S. military casualties, and Presidential vote choice in 2004.
We argue that the willingness of the public to pay the costs of war and to reelect incumbent Presidents during wartime are dependent on the interac-tion of two attitudes-one retrospective and one prospective. In particular,
we show that retrospective evaluations of whether President Bush "did the right thing" in attacking Iraq and prospective judgments about whether the U.S. will ultimately be successful in Iraq are two critical attitudes for understanding how foreign policy judgments affect vote choice and one's tolerance for casualties 2 Further, we show that the retrospective judgments serve as a more powerful predictor for vote choice, while the prospective evaluations of mission success better predict continued support for the war in Iraq. These claims are consistent with the broader literature on how foreign policy influences voting behavior, and the literature that examines the public's response to war and casualties. However, we also show that these retrospective and prospective judgments are interactive, and that a person's attitude on one conditions the effect of the other. This interaction operates on "political" support (vote choice) as well as "mission" support (casualty tolerance).
To our knowledge, no other work integrates political support for the President and support for American war efforts into a single theoretical model and uses the same predictor variables to explain the separate dependent vari-
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We use the term "casualties" to refer to "deaths." We recognize that in military parlance, casualties means dead and wounded, a much higher number than deaths alone. In popular usage, however, casualties has generally meant dead. In our own polling, we used "deaths" in all relevant question wordings, unless otherwise noted, so our claims are not contaminated by any public confusion about the terms.
able measures of vote choice and casualty tolerance. This article successfully bridges gaps in the literature by using one theoretical framework to answer two separate research questions: 1) whether and how foreign policy affects political evaluation and choice, and 2) the conditions under which American citizens will bear the financial and human cost of military missions.
Our argument proceeds as follows. Section 2 is a review of the foreign policy voting literature and the casualty tolerance literature. Section 3 demonstrates the increased importance in foreign affairs for the 2004 election. Section 4 develops the model, and Section 5 shows data and methods.
2 Literature Review
Foreign Policy and Political Behavior
Scholars have long been troubled by Americans' inability to answer survey questions "correctly." Poor performance on surveys has led observers to view the American public as an ill-informed lot with little ability to think coherently about the substance of politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964 In support of this claim many studies showed, at best, weak evidence that foreign affairs affected the voting decision (e.g. Almond 1950; Stokes 1966) .
As Almond writes "Foreign policy attitudes among most Americans lack intellectual structure and factual content."
However, ever since the early work denigrating the capacity of the American public, a "new look" in opinion research has slowly emerged that has greatly rehabilitated the discipline's view of the average citizen and voter (Sniderman 1993) . As evidence accumulates that voters make reasonable or competent decisions from limited amounts of information (e.g. Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991) , it is no longer so unreasonable to think that the distant world of foreign affairs can have a meaningful impact on public opinion.
Two reinforcing lines of research illuminate the importance of foreign policy judgments. The first line of research shows that foreign policy attitudes are well structured and that the public responds rationally and intelligently to developments in the international arena. The second line of research shows that these foreign policy judgments affect vote choice and presidential approval.
John Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a; b; Peffley and Hurwitz 1993) demonstrate that citizens have reasonably structured attitudes concerning foreign policy. Attitudes of foreign policy affect political evaluations, and citizens respond in understandable ways to changing world events.
Such evidence of a "rational public" regarding foreign affairs is widespread (Holsti 1997; Shapiro and Page 1988; Wittkopf 1990 (Shapiro and Page 1988, pp. 220-221) . Wlezien (1995; shows that the public's preferences for defense spending responded to spending levels as well as feelings toward the Soviet Union. However, the impact of foreign policy on electoral choice does appear to wax and wane with the flow of current events. This pattern is hardly surprising.
As we note below, survey responses regarding the nation's "most important problem" suggest that the economy is nearly always salient in the minds of voters, while concern about foreign affairs varies substantially.
In sum, we would point to three well supported findings concerning foreign affairs and political behavior: 1) Citizen attitudes about foreign policy are well structured, 2) Foreign policy evaluations matter for presidential approval and presidential vote choice, and 3) Citizen attitudes respond to changes in the international arena.
Casualty tolerance
Ever since the Vietnam War, policymakers have worried that the American public will support military operations only if the human costs of the war, as measured in combat casualties, are minimal. Building on earlier research on war and public opinion (Milstein 1974 ), John Mueller (1973 This complex finding-that casualties have a more corrosive effect on public support early in the war than they do later-gradually became simplified in the conventional wisdom to the view that the public will not tolerate casualties. Edward Luttwak summarized the conventional wisdom well: "The prospect of high casualties, which can rapidly undermine domestic support for any military operations, is the key political constraint when decisions must be made on which forces to deploy in a crisis, and at what levels" (Luttwak 1996, p. 36) .
In other words, Mueller argued that the public was casualty sensitive.
But the conventional wisdom, pushed in part by missions like Somalia, translated Mueller's claim into a conviction that the public was casualty phobic (Hyde 2000; Klaevas 2000; Lane 1998; Luttwak 1994; Moskos 1995; Record 2000; Sapolsky and Shapiro 1996) . Casualty sensitivity recognizes the human toll as a cost of war; casualty phobia refers to a sensitivity so great that it amounts to an unwillingness to support a military operation if even very low human costs are incurred (Feaver and Gelpi 2004) . We hope to revise this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that the public's willingness to pay the human costs of war and its propensity to punish its leaders electorally for using force vary depending on specific attitudes about the war.
Casualty sensitivity is, to put it crudely, one's price sensitivity to the human cost of war. As with other forms of price sensitivity, some members of the public are more sensitive to the costs than others. We see in the public a continuum of casualty sensitivity ranging from the minimally sensitivethose who view casualties as a necessary cost of war and not a determining factor in shaping support-all the way to maximally sensitive, or those who support only military missions that guarantee virtually no casualties. 4 Over the past decade, many scholars have worked to debunk the myth of a strictly 4 Some members of the public might also be insensitive to casualties because they are opposed to the use of military force regardless of the number of U.S. casualties. We account for this possibility in our measurement of casualty tolerance.
casualty phobic public.
While the view that the public is casualty phobic is widely entrenched among policymakers and the elite (Destler and Kull 1999) , in fact something close to the opposite consensus has emerged in academic studies of American public opinion. Bruce Jentleson (Britton and Jentleson 1998; Jentleson 1992) finds that the public is "pretty prudent," and will support paying even costly military operations provided the mission rationale conforms to certain standards. Eric Larson (1996) argues that the public uses a rational cost-benefit model in which the public depends very heavily on elite cues; when there is an elite consensus (defined as congressional support) in favor of a military mission, casualties are not highly corrosive to support (Larson 1996) . James Burk (1999) shows that public support for missions did not collapse with casualties, even in the "hard" cases of Lebanon 1983 and Somalia 1993. I.M. Destler and Steven Kull (1999) show that public casualty tolerance even in "unpopular" missions like peace operations in Bosnia is much greater than previously thought; moreover, public tolerance of casualties is particularly a function of "international elite consensus" in the form of multilateral support for the military operation.
Of course, even if the public as a whole is not casualty phobic, it still may be the case that some people are. Feaver and Gelpi (2004) Gallup does not have apples-to-apples data for 1988. In most years, the "most important problem" question allows respondents to mention more than one problem, i.e. the same respondent could say both "the economy" Because we only polled in this election, we cannot make inferences about the importance of foreign affairs compared to other years based on this data alone. However, Table 1 shows that the proportion stating foreign policy as the most important issue doubled between the conclusion of the Democratic primary campaigns and the general election in November.
[ Table 1 
The Model
We build on Fiorina's (1981) We expound on this intuition two steps further: we argue that (1) the interaction of the retrospective and prospective judgements determines vote choice and casualty tolerance, and (2) the relative weight assigned to retrospective or prospective judgements differs, depending on whether it is vote choice or casualty tolerance that is in question.
We additionally argue that the effect of these two attitudes both on vote choice and casualty tolerance will be interactive. According to the logic outlined above, we would expect attitudes about whether attacking Iraq was the "right thing" to have little impact on casualty tolerance for respondents who feel that success is unlikely. If victory is unlikely, the initial wisdom of the decision to use force has little impact on the expected benefits (and thus the tolerable costs) of the war. But if victory is likely, then attitudes about whether the war was the "right thing" should have a substantial impact on the expected benefits from the conflict and influence casualty tolerance.
Similarly, the likely prospects for success should have little impact on one's judgment about the wisdom of using force if one does not believe that using force was the "right thing" in the first place. However, if one believes that the initial decision to use force was the "right thing" to do, then one's attitude about the likelihood of success should have a significant impact on one's judgment of the overall wisdom of U.S. policy, and thus on one's willingness to reelect the President.
Data and Methods
We propose here a latent variable approach in place of an explicitly spatial model. Rather than utility functions of competing candidates, we see "Bush support" and "casualty tolerance" as underlying attitudes expressed as latent variables. Individuals possess some quantity of these underlying attitudes, which we model as
We keep this compatible with Fiorina (1981) by using a vector of predictor variables consistent with his generalized voter's calculus with separate evaluations for political predispositions (long-term past experience), political past experience (near-term experience under an incumbent), and future expectations. This yields the following equation:
In Equation Table 2 reports marginals for our vote choice and casualty tolerance variables. Full question wording is available in the measurement appendix.
[ Table 2 about here]
Because we are using ordinal scales to represent underlying latent attitudes, ordered logit is an ideal estimation technique. We estimate the following models for both vote choice and casualty tolerance: y * i = β 0 + β 1 P artyID + β 2 RightT hing + β 3 Success +β 23 RightT hing * Success + ǫ i .
y * i = β 0 + β 1 P artyID + β 2 RightT hing + β 3 Success +β 23 RightT hing * Success + β 4 Age + β 5 Education
PartyID is a standard partisan identification question, coded as Democrat (-1), Independent (0), and Republican (1). RightThing and Success are both four point Likert scales. RightThing asks respondents if they approve of the original decision to use military force against Iraq and is coded from "Strongly Disapprove" (0) to "Strongly Approve" (3). Success asks respondents if they think the U.S. is likely to succeed in Iraq, and is coded from "Not at all likely" (0) to "Very likely" (3). The independent variables are coded so that we would expect to see positive coefficients in the ordered logistic regressions.
In other words, we expect a one unit increase in the independent variable to be associated a respondent possessing a greater quantity of the underlying attitude under investigation, whether voting for Bush or casualty tolerance. Table 3 shows the estimates from Equations 3 and 4 for both dependent variables.
[ Table 3 about here]
As expected RightThing is a significant predictor of the both vote choice and casualty tolerance dependent variables, as is Success (see footnote 8).
Also as hypothesized, there is a significant interaction between the two attitudes: the slope of Success is contingent on the value of RightThing and vice versa.
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[ Figure 1 about here]
Because logit coefficients are extremely difficult to interpret directly, we use predicted probability graphs to show the relationship between variables Table 3 , the graph shows that RightThing always matters in predicting the probability of voting for Bush. Certainly, RightThing matters more as one ascends through Success from "Not at all likely"
to "Very likely."
[ Figure 2 about here]
When we graph the predicted probability of voting for Bush as a function of Success (Figure 2 ), we find that this variable does not always matter.
When RightThing is "Strongly Disapprove," Success has little to no effect on the predicted probability of voting for Bush (this is the graphical way to interpret the non-significant coefficient for Success in Table 3 in Models 1 & 2). The effect of Success is significant for all other values of RightThing.
When we examine the predicted probability of voting for Bush across the values of Success, and see how the change is affected by different values of RightThing, we see much more modest differences in the change across
Success, but much greater differences in the predicted probability at the lowest point in the scale ("Not at all likely").
[ Figure 3 about here]
Figures 3 and 4 show a nearly identical pattern, but in reverse. Consistent with our expectations, when predicting whether one will tolerate at least 1500 casualties in Iraq, Success becomes more important and RightThing explains less of the action. When Success is "Not at all likely", the probability of tolerating 1500 casualties is equally low regardless of the value of RightThing.
(Again, the is the graphical way to interpret the non-significant coefficient for RightThing in Models 3 & 4.) Success, however, is always significant and is responsible for a big change in the predicted probability of supporting the war in Iraq, even if the U.S. suffers 1500 casualties.
[ Figure 4 
about here]
So what is the substantive significance of these attitudes and the interaction between them? People who hold both beliefs-that the war was right and that the U.S. will win-indicate the strongest support for continuing military action even in the face of mounting casualties and for reelecting President Bush. Likewise, people who hold the opposite view-that the war was wrong and that the U.S. will lose-have the strongest opposition both to paying any more human cost and to reelecting Bush. Think of the former as the "Bush Base" and the latter group as the "Vietnam Syndrome" crowd.
The intermediate attitudes-the "Noble Failure" view that the war was right but we will lose, and the "Pottery Barn" view (you break it, you fix it) that the war was wrong but we will win-operate in surprising ways. The Pottery Barn crowd is, on average, more likely than the Noble Failure crowd to stomach continued military action. In contrast, the Noble Failure subgroup indicates stronger support for Bush.
[ Table 4 about here]
What can these results tell us about why Bush 43 was able to win reelection despite a costly and controversial war? Our data suggest that on balance the war in Iraq helped the President rather than hurt him. But it did not help him because the public reflexively refuses to oust the Commanderin-Chief during wartime. After all, a significant proportion of the public was strongly opposed to the war and sought vigorously to remove the President as a result. Instead, the war helped the President to win reelection and maintain support for the war because he was able to persuade a majority of the public of two simple points: 1) attacking Iraq was the "right thing" to do, and 2) the U.S. will ultimately succeed in Iraq. Specifically, we found that 49% of our respondent's fell into the "Bush Base" category described above, while 15% were identified as "Pottery Barn," 8% as "Noble Failure," and 29% as in the "Vietnam Syndrome" category. Support from Bush Base and Noble Failure voters kept the President in office, while Bush Base and Pottery Barn respondents maintained popular support for the war (see Table   4 ).
Finally, as a pooling test to probe the robustness of our results, we re-run the analyses just among those who say foreign policy is the most important issue and among those who say economics is the most important issue.
We find that the issue respondents report as being most important slightly changes the relative strength of our predictor variables, but that the overall causal story remains intact-RightThing is a better predictor of the vote, while Success is a better predictor of casualty tolerance.
Restricting our analysis to just those respondents who cite economic concerns almost perfectly reproduces our findings (which should be expected
given their preponderance in the data-set). Goodness-of-fit statistics, such as maximum likelihood analogs to R 2 , drop. But this should also be expected;
those who do not identify foreign policy as their primary concern ought to have less variance explained with measures of foreign policy attitudes.
[ Table 5 about here]
Replicating the ordered logits among the subset of respondents who report foreign policy as the most important issue, we are able to explain a greater proportion of the variance. If we are making a claim about the explanatory power of foreign policy attitudes, it stands to reason that there should be extra explanatory "juice" among those who consider foreign policy the most important issue. In explaining vote choice, the Pseudo-R 2 jumps.
The interaction between RightThing and Success continues to be significant when we are predicting vote choice. However, when we examine casualty tolerance, the interaction term loses its significance. Dropping the interaction term from the model leaves both RightThing and Success as significant predictor variables, with the latter having a coefficient more than two and a half times as large as the former. While the interaction term is no longer significant, the relatively greater importance of Success as a predictor variable conforms with our overall story and explanation of how different attitudes affect vote choice and casualty tolerance. The more one cares about foreign policy, the more one focuses on the likelihood of success as the critical factor in deciding whether to supporting the continuation of the war.
Conclusion
The 
